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  This paper presents a study to investigate the effect of tax strategy on tax evasion in province of 
Zanjan, Iran. The study selects two randomly selected populations of 100 people from Tax 
organization and the people who file income tax with revenue agency. The study designs a 
questionnaire in Likert scale to study the effects of five variables namely; promote tax culture, 
lack of belief in tax payment consequences, filing false tax statement, tax exemption and 
general culture community as independent variables on tax evasion behavior. Using regression 
technique, the study has determined positive and meaningful relationships between tax evasion 
and independent variables.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Tax is the primary source of development of economy and reaching sustainable development. 
However, a critical review of existing measures of tax evasion implies the necessity for innovative 
measurement tax strategies (Korndörfer et al., 2014). Elffers et al. (1987) developed a new method 
for documenting cases of individual tax evasion without compromising confidentiality. According to 
Skinner and Slemrod (1985), public policy towards tax evasion reflects complex and competing 
objectives of gathering taxes effectively and treating taxpayers fairly. Janeba and Peters (1999) 
applied a game–theoretic approach to analyze the taxation of interest income in Europe in the 
presence of tax evasion. The model helps assess the success of different reform proposals. They 
argued that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays essential role. Marrelli and 
Martina (1988) analyzed the optimal tax evasion decision in the context of an oligopolistic market 
with quantity setting companies. They reported that the optimal amount of tax evasion for each firm 
could not only depend on the degree of collusion in the market but also on the relative market shares 
of the companies; increasing collusion, however, leads to a larger amount of tax evasion in the 
market.   
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Crocker and Slemrod (2005) investigated corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual 
relationship between the shareholders of a company and a tax manager who possesses private 
information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may 
also undertake illegal tax evasion. David and Semerád (2014) dealt with the possibilities of estimating 
the amount of tax evasion concerning value added tax in the fuel market in the Czech Republic. They 
proposed a specific original method of quantification of tax evasion on the basis of data associated 
with distributor prices, gathered during the year 2012, and information obtained from the survey of 
interested entities.  
 
Bertotti and Modanese (2014) investigated the impact of tax evasion on the income distribution and 
the inequality index of a society through a kinetic model explained by a set of nonlinear ordinary 
differential equations. The model helps compute the global outcome of binary and multiple 
microscopic interactions between individuals. When evasion happens, both individuals involved in a 
binary interaction take advantage of it, while the rest of the society is deprived of a part of the 
planned redistribution. The impact of evasion on the income distribution was to decrease the 
population of the middle classes and it could increase the poor and rich classes. They studied the 
dependence of the Gini index on various parameters when the evasion rate increases proportionally to 
a taxation rate. They also evaluated the relative probability of class advancement of individuals 
because of direct interactions and welfare provisions, and some typical temporal rates of convergence 
of the income distribution to its equilibrium state. 
 
2. The proposed study  
 
This paper presents a study to investigate the effect of tax strategy on tax evasion in province of 
Zanjan, Iran. There are approximately 250 employees who work for Tax organization and 10000 
residence normally file income tax with the revenue agency in city of Zanjan, Iran. The study selects 
two randomly selected populations of 100 people from Tax organization and the people who file 
income tax with revenue agency. In our survey, 300 of the people who participated in our survey 
were male and the remaining 100 people were female. In addition, 303 of them were married and 97 
of them were single. Fig. 1 demonstrates other characteristics of the participants. 
 
 
Age  Years of education  Area of business activities  
Fig. 1. Personal characteristics of the participants 
 
As we can observe from the results of Fig. 1, most participants were middle-aged people with some 
university degrees and they were involved mainly in administration as well as financial activities. The 
proposed study of this paper uses regression technique to study the relationship between tax evasion 
as dependent variable and five independent variables, which is stated as follows, 
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where   1 x to  5 x represent failure to effectively promote tax culture, lack of belief in tax payment 
consequences, filing false tax statement, tax exemption and general culture community, respectively. 
In addition,  0  to  5  represent the coefficients to be estimated and finally,   represents the residuals. 
The proposed study of this paper designs a questionnaire in Likert scale and first distributes it among 
20 experts, 10 from each group, to verify the questionnaire. Table 1 demonstrates Cronbach alpha for 
all components of the survey. 
 
Table 1 
The summary of Cronbach alphas 
Variable Cronbach  alpha 
Tax evasion  0.732 
Failure to effectively promote tax culture  0.814 
Lack of belief in tax payment consequences  0.788 
Filing false tax statement  0.763 
Tax exemption  0.752 
General culture community  0.753 
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 1, all components of the survey are within desirable level 
and we may process other components of the survey. Fig. 1 demonstrates the results of changes in 
residuals associated with dependent variable, tax evasion.  
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of residuals of tax evasion 
 
As we can observe from the result of Fig. 1, the residuals seem to be normally distributed. In 
addition, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test has been executed on different variables and Table 2 shows the 
results of our survey. 
 
Table 2 
The summary of Kolmogorov-Smirnov method 
  y   x1 x2 x3 x4   x5
Mean   3.3971   3.1271 3.3687 3.222 3.4579   3.371
Standard deviation   0.70733   0.71894 0.61346 0.7629 0.72032   0.6902
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z   0.125   0.063 0.062 0.071 0.077   0.071
Sig.   .000
c   .001
c .001
c .000
c .000
c   .000
c
c Sig. < 0.01 
 
The results of Table 2 clearly indicate that all components of the survey were normally distributed 
when the level of significance is one percent.  
 
3. The results 
 
In this section, we present the results of the implementation of regression technique on Eq. (1). Table 
3 shows details of our findings. In addition, Table 4 demonstrates the results of ANOVA test.   2378
Table 3 
The summary of regression technique 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients   t   Sig.  
B Std. Error Beta
 (Constant)  -0.014   0.004 -3.168   0.002
Promote tax culture  0.202 0.001 0.335 218.636   0
Lack of belief in tax payment consequences  0.199 0.001 0.291 218.593   0
Filing false tax statement  0.202 0.001 0.266 193.207   0
Tax exemption  0.202 0.001 0.265 199.135   0
General culture community  0.2 0.001 0.298 195.461   0
 
Table 4 
The results of ANOVA test 
  Sum of Squares   df   Mean Square   F   Sig.  
Regression  93.735   5   18.747   582202.28   .000
b  
Residual  0.013   394   0  
Total  93.747   399  
 
As we can observe from the results of Table 3 F-value is statistically meaningful. In addition, all t-
student values are also statistically meaningful when the level of significance is one percent.  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
According to the results of Table 3, promoting tax culture is the most important factor influencing on 
tax evasion behavior. People must understand that tax is the primary source of development of 
economy. People need to understand that the country’s infrastructure development depends on 
government’s income and tax is the primary sources for sustainable development. In our survey, 
general culture of community is the second important issues influencing on sustainable development. 
Lack of belief in tax payment consequences is the next factor influencing on tax evasion behavior. In 
our survey, people may be under the impression that government may always collect necessary 
budget through selling natural resources such as oil and gas. They may not think the collecting tax is 
a more diversified method for revenue agency department and reduces the risk of budget deficit. 
Many people may report unrealistic numbers for their tax and government must use modern 
techniques to prevent any false statement.  
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